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INTERBUDGETARY DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES IN RUSSIA: 
CONCENTRATION OF POWER OR MANAGEMENT DECENTRALIZATION  1
For the whole social development of Russia as a democratic federal state, federal relations are basic. In 
this regard, it is particularly important to strike a balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces. The 
analysis of budget indicators presented in the article revealed the growing process of centralization, which 
enabled to conclude the low efficiency of the modern mechanism of tax allocation and its non-compliance 
to the principles of fiscal federalism. The growing budget crisis of the regions and the long-felt need of the 
structural reforming of Russian tax system require speedy implementation of internal reserves. Among these 
provisions, Russian scientists including the Institute of Socio-Economic Development of Territories of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences see the urgent need of the structural reform of the tax system in the Russian 
Federation. The results of the scientific search for answers to the questions of how and what it is expedient 
to amend, supplement, and delete in the Russian tax system are presented. In order to create incentives for 
the territorial authorities to increase the income, the algorithm of the distribution of tax revenue between 
the federal and regional budgets is developed on the basis of the estimations of the ratio of the volume of 
tax revenues collected in the region and received by the federal budget. Experimental calculations on the 
example of 83 entities of the Russian Federation have identified the existing provisions of tax revenue growth 
in 36 entities that could increase revenues by 2–12 %. The authors have proposed a set of key measures for 
optimizing the tax incentive policies, involving the development of selective and differential principles of tax 
incentives, the introduction of compensatory forms of the loss of income as a result of benefits. The main 
measures to enhance the collection of regional and local property taxes are systematized.
Keywords: federal budget, regional budgets, local budgets, decentralization, budgetary authority, tax system, the 
effectiveness of tax policy, intergovernmental relations, the distribution of tax revenues, the increase of tax collection, 
optimization of preferential incentives
Introduction
The consolidation of the unity and development of the federal state considerably depend on the 
efficiency in organizing cooperation between federal state government bodies, the state government 
authorities of the entities and local government bodies, i.e. on the formation of federal relations. Their 
improvement is the primary condition for the development of territories. As A.I. Tatarkin notes [1], 
federal relations can contribute to the stable and system-based development of the society (if they are 
based on comprehensive consideration and full use of each federal entity's peculiarities), but also can 
constrain social development in the case of excessive concentration of powers and budget revenues at 
the federal level. 
The hypothesis of the research lies in the fact that the effective formation of federal relations can 
be accomplished by transforming the architecture of interbudgetary relations and tax system from 
the principles of the ''equalization and survival'' of territories to the principles of their ''sustainable 
development and stimulation of the initiative'' for the formation of financially stable territorial systems. 
Results and Methods of the Research
1. Problem of Interbudgetary Relations and Combination of Principles Concerning  
the Centralization and Decentralization of Powers
According to the general provisions of the federal relations concept established by Professor 
I. Popitsa [2], a division of public finance into federal system and a set of particular (regional) subsystems 
reflects the term ''budgetary federalism''. In the scientific literature, such notion is defined as a 
complicated and dynamic system of fiscal relations between regulatory and administrative authorities, 
1 Original Russian Text © Pechenskaya M. A., Uskova T. V, published in Ekonomika regiona [Economy of Region]. — 2016. — Vol. 12, 
Issue 3. — 875–886.
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based on the principles of combining the interests and independence of the budgets of different levels, 
delimitation of budgetary rights and authorities in the field of budgetary resources' formation and 
expenditure and conformity of financial resources to executing functions. 
There are no similar regulations and demands of forming interbudgetary relations in the federal 
nations. On the contrary, global experience shows a variety of budgetary federalism's patterns. In 
the USA, for instance, each kind of taxation is assigned to the particular level of the budget system, 
and the states compete for the attraction of investors in order to increase budget revenues, whereas 
redistributional mechanisms do not play a prominent part [3]. In the Federal Republic of Germany, 
in contrast, within the mechanism of fiscal capacity equalization, the more developed lands transfer 
money to less developed ones [4]. But the key efficiency criterion for any pattern of budgetary 
federalism is the agreement and coordination of economic, social, political and other interests of 
different management levels that, in the long run, reflects the quality and level of budgetary facilities 
provided to the population [5, 6]. 
''At the moment, the established system of interbudgetary relations in Russia does not provide 
the appropriate balance of interests of all budgets of the budget system, because it differs in excessive 
centralization of resources'', — such a conclusion was made by the representatives of the legislative 
and executive authorities on the conference ''Budgetary federalism: results and prospects'' held in the 
Federal Council in 2014 2. Russian practice instead of the appropriate balance of the interests of different 
management levels shows their collision in the process of both primary distribution, and secondary 
distribution of financial means. Moreover, the underdevelopment of settlement mechanisms adversely 
affects the budget system and socio-economic development of the country. 
Taking into consideration the multidimensionality and complexity of the interbudgetary 
financial resources distribution system according to the management levels, this article presents 
the authors' striving to the investigate transformations of the primary (tax) distribution of budget 
authorities from the standpoint of their influence on the territories' possibilities to self-development 
under the conditions of the federal state. Taking into account that the owned 3 revenues of the 
Russian territories' budget systems are formed by more than 87 % of tax proceeds, the volumes of 
tax competence 4 become determinant when it comes to revenues distribution according to the levels 
of the budget system. 
Due to the current scientific approaches to the problem of budgetary and tax authorities 
distribution, two reverse principles of forming the structure of primary financial flows and volumes of 
financial resources, accessible to managing the particular level of power, can be marked. As A. G. Igudin 
notes [7], one of the authors of the established interbudgetary relations system at present, budgetary 
federalism combines principles of centralism and decentralism. 
The first principle implies expediency of centralization of income sources at a high level for providing 
macro-stability and macro-governance. Negative consequences after passing the presidential decree 5 
of 1993 according to which regions and local governments have gained the right to introduce their own 
taxes, can be presented as a historical argument against widening tax competence of local authorities. 
The rapid growth of the number of taxes (200 items to 1996) has resulted in sharp deterioration of 
tax climate, instability of tax legislation, an increase in the economic inefficiency of managing the 
majority of taxes and disparity between the rich and poor regions [8]. 
The second principle is considered as the contemporary challenge to the centralized system of 
organizing powers and points out its disadvantages that lie in restricting own income basis of territories, 
financial and political dependence from the higher authorities, decreasing incentives and possibilities 
of providing efficient self-development of territories, weakening of responsibility for managerial 
inaction and taking unpopular managerial decisions [9].
2 Byudzhetnyy federalizm. Itogi i perspektivy. Rekomendatsii nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii [Budgetary federalism. Results and 
prospects. Recommendations of research and practice conference]. Ofitsialnyy sayt Soveta Federatsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Official site 
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation]. Retrieved from: http://budget.council.gov.ru/activity/other_activities/42719/ (date of 
access: October 15, 2015).
3 By owned revenues of the budget we mean combination of tax and non-tax revenues. 
4 Legislative delegation of particular volume of tax regulations and powers to government bodies. 
5 Presidential decree dated December 22, 1993 No. 2268 ''On forming the republican budget of the Russian Federation and relations 
with budgets of the Russian Federation's subjects in 1994''. Available at the the legal reference system ''ConsultantPlus''.
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2. Analysis of Tax Distribution According to the Levels of Budget System in Russia 
Contemporary scientific studies point out the necessity of institutional changes in regional 
development, the primary of which is — the decentralization of management. Russian officials 
have announced finance decentralization course 6, however, understanding the necessity of budget 
authorities’ decentralization process at the federal level slightly correlate to practice. N. V. Zubarevich 
[10], Professor at the MSU, chief of the regional programme of the Independent Institute for Social 
Policy, has named the measures taken by authorities to proceed to the real federalism and to support 
local government, palliative and has noted the long-felt need of changing the structure of tax system.
According to the principal counselor of the State Duma of RF O. A. Borzunova [11], the systemic 
reform of 2004 has changed the concept and methodological framework of the tax system, on the 
contrary, led to the restricting income sources of territories (reduction of the number of regional taxes 
from seven to three, local taxes — from five to two; abolishment of sales tax; reduction of the list and 
standards of payments from regulatory taxes, entering territorial budgets).
Reforming the tax distribution system during 1999–2014 has led to the reduction of the budget 
income sources of the Russian Federation's entities by 35 % (Table 1).
Table 1
Dynamics in tax revenues structure of consolidated budgets  
of the Russian Federation's entities in 1999 and 2014*
Tax revenues
1999 2014
billion rubles % billion rubles %
Corporate income tax 139.9 28.1 1961.7 30.2
Personal income tax 97.3 19.5 2680.8 41.3
Value added tax 67.1 13.5 0 0
Excise taxes 24.9 5.0 486.0 7.5
Sales tax 19.3 3.9 0 0
Total income taxes 5.7 1.1 315.0 4.9
Property taxes 52.5 10.6 957.5 14.7
Payments for the use of natural resources 34.7 7.0 50.0 0.8
Other taxes, levies and contributions 56.4 11.3 36.4 0.6
Tax revenues, total 497.8 100.0 6487.4 100.0
* Calculated according to the accountancy data of the Federal State Statistics Service — http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_
main/rosstat/ru/statistics/finance/# (date of access: October 15, 2015), Russian Federal Treasury — http://www.roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-
byudzhetov/konsolidirovannye-byudzhety-subektov/ (date of access: October 15, 2015).
The Russian scales of local authorities' competence on revenues, in general, can be defined through 
the distribution of their relevance to the gross product. The share of revenues in GDP specifies the place 
of any level of the budget system in the consolidated budget of the country. According to the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation 7, the share of revenues of consolidated budgets of the Russian 
Federation's entities in GDP from 2000 to 2013 has decreased from 14.6 to 12.3 %, whereas the share of 
revenues of the federal budget has increased — from 29 % to 36 %. It is direct evidence that the smallest 
part of increment in gross product falls to regions. The share of tax proceeds of consolidated budgets 
of the Federation's entities in GDP has gone through reduction as well over the same period — from 
10.2 % to 8.9 % (fig. 1). 
The first edition of Budget code has contained the standard 8 according to which tax revenues of 
the regional budgets should comprise at least 50 % from the amount of country's consolidated budget 
revenues. However, the required correlation by the code has not practically been observed. Rather on 
6 O razgranichenii polnomochiy mezhdu organami vlasti i sovershenstvovanii mezhbyudzhetnykh otnosheniy. Mat-ly zasedaniya 
Gossoveta RF [On delimitation of powers between the government authorities and improvement of interbudgetary relations. Records from 
the meeting of the State Council of RF]. Retrieved from: http://special.kremlin.ru/events/state-council/14139 (date of access: October 25, 
2015). Retrieved from: http://ria.ru/economy/20130425/934503631.html#ixzz3q2Wkdnke (date of access: October 25, 2015).
7 Yubileynyy Analiticheskiy vestnik k 20-letiyu vypuska [Jubilee Analytical Herald devoted to the twentieth anniversary of publication]. 
(2014). Analiticheskiy vestnik Soveta Federatsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Analytical Herald of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation], 
32(550). Retrieved from: http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d5396ad1cf4d98c17e.pdf (date of access: November 01, 2015).
8 Article 48. Regulating budgets revenues. Budget code of RF dated July 31, 1998 No.145-FL. Available at the legal reference system 
''ConsultantPlus''.
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the contrary, from year to year regions have received a minority share of revenues — it reduced from 
56 % in 1997 to 46 % in 2014 (fig. 2). 
Such circumstance has reduced in a greater degree the conformance of the tax system to the 
requirements of budgetary federalism. It should be noted that the increase of the share of regional 
and local budgets revenues in 2009 was caused by manifestations of crisis in the economy and by 
reducing proceeds from the federal income taxes (by 39 %) and mining operations (by 30 %), but not 
by decentralization processes. The contemporary tax system in Russia is formed in such a way that the 
competence over the majority of tax types is assigned to the federal level of power. More than 80 % 
of tax revenues of the local budgets fall on payments from federal taxes 9. Therewith regions and local 
governments do not have an opportunity to influence federal taxes. Moreover, for instance, federal TIPI 
forms tax revenues of the entities' budgets by 41 %, town and rural settlements by 43 %, urban districts 
by 60 %, municipal areas by 81 % 10. 
Almost half (47.4 %) of tax proceeds and levies in the process of primary distribution go from 
territories to the federal budget. The number of RF entities that have transferred more than a half of 
collected funds increases as well. The largest volumes of taxes collected on the territories of the Ural 
Federal District, the Volga Federal District and the Northwestern Federal District go into the federal 
budget. It points to the fact that federal taxes play the prevailing role in tax proceeds of these regions. 
For instance, in the entities of the Northwestern Federal District, the share of tax payments, collected 
on their territories, but according to the Russian legislation transferred to the centre, comprised 43.5 % 
9 Calculated according to the accountancy data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia. Retrieved from: https://www.nalog.ru/rn35/
related_activities/statistics_and_analytics/forms/ (date of access: October 15, 2015).
10 Calculated according to the accountancy data of Russian Federal Treasury. Retrieved from: http://www.roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-
byudzhetov/konsolidirovannye-byudzhety-subektov/ (date of access: October 15, 2015).
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Fig. 1. Tax revenues of consolidated budgets of RF's entities in 2000–2013 (Calculated according to the accountancy data of 
the Federal State Statistics Service [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/
ru/statistics/finance/# (date of access: October 15, 2015), Russian Federal Treasury [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.
roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-byudzhetov/konsolidirovannye-byudzhety-subektov/ (date of access: October 15, 2015)
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Fig. 2. Correlation of tax revenues of the regions' consolidated budgets and the federal budget of RF (without including 
UST) in 1997–2014, % (Calculated according to the accountancy data of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation 
[Electronic resource]. URL: http://audit.gov.ru/activities/audit-of-the-federal-budget/21096/ (accessed October 17, 2015))
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(fig. 3). And this is happening under the conditions of growing deficit execution and a debt burden of 
budgets. 
A lack of proportionality of the primary and secondary distribution should not be left unmentioned. 
During 2006–2014, such entities of the Northwestern Federal District as Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad 
Oblast and Leningrad Oblast, Komi Republic have transferred to the federal budget more revenues than 
came back in the form of financial aid and public budget loans (table 2).
Table 2
Correlation of revenues, transferred to the federal budget and received from it by the Northwestern Federal 
District's regions (2006–2014)*
Entity of the Northwestern 
Federal District
Transferred to the federal 
budget, billion rubles
Received from the federal 
budget, billion rubles
Correlation of transferred 
and receives funds, times 
Komi Republic 309.6 51.9 5.97
Leningrad Oblast 240.1 61.4 3.91
Saint Petersburg 753.9 234.1 3.22
Kaliningrad Oblast 161.5 97.6 1.65
Vologda Oblast 54.2 63.2 0.86
Murmansk Oblast 42.5 80.3 0.53
Novgorod Oblast 18.1 46.9 0.39
Arkhangelsk Oblast 32.9 122.3 0.27
Pskov Oblast 11.4 57.7 0.20
The Republic of Karelia 11.1 56.4 0.19
* Calculated according to the accountancy data of Russian Federal Treasury (http://www.roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-byudzhetov/
konsolidirovannye-byudzhety-subektov/ (date of access: October 15, 2015).
Moreover, the basic load of satisfaction of population's essential needs is laid on the government 
authorities of RF's entities and local government authorities. The share of regional budgets in the 
country's consolidated budget expenses comprises 88 % on housing and public utilities, 88 % — on 
education, 71 % — on public health services, 77 % — on culture 11. 
As N. V. Zubarevich notes [10], taking into consideration all the risks, the transition to 
decentralization ''will give a chance to replace the fight of regions for federal transfers by the policy of 
improving institutions under the conditions of competition for investment and human capital''. In the 
Russian conditions, it is necessary to combine centralization and decentralization of tax and budgetary 
authorities in an optimal way. When the population of the whole country makes benefits from each 
unit of public goods, then absolute decentralization of management is virtually impossible. But the 
composition of public goods, which are essential for a population of different Russian territories, is 
unequal; here the localization of benefits brought by the public good takes place. This fact justifies the 
necessity of self-dependence at the certain level in determining requirements in public goods and in 
allocating resources for their satisfaction. 
11 Calculated according to the accountancy data of Russian Federal Treasury (http://www.roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-byudzhetov/ (date 
of access: October 16, 2015).
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Fig. 3. Taxes, levies, and other mandatory charges entered the federal budget from the total amount raised on the territory 
of the Northwestern Federal District's entities in 2006 –2014 (Calculated according to the accountancy data of the Federal 
Tax Service of Russia — https://www.nalog.ru/rn35/related_activities/statistics_and_analytics/forms/ (accessed October 15, 
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3. Efficiency Enhancement in Distributing Tax Revenues between the Levels of Budget System 
The investigations conducted by the Institute of Socio-Economic Development of Territories of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences devoted to the problems of interbudgetary relations have shown the 
necessity of improving the mechanism of distributing tax revenues between the federal and regional 
levels. Under the conditions of the course focused on decentralization of tax powers and on finding 
the ways of territories' self-development, it seems to be possible to propose a thesis that correlation of 
collected tax revenues and those entered the superior budget should not exceed the level of previous 
years. For instance, in practice the number of the Northwestern Federal District's regions transferred to 
the federal budget more funds in the current year than in the previous one have increased from one in 
2006 to seven in 2014 (table 3). Under this mechanism of tax distribution, the result of more efficient 
work of territorial government officials on building taxable capacity leads to the fact that the appeared 
increment transfers to the federal budget again. 
Table 3
Share of tax revenues entered the federal budget from the volume of collected revenues on the territory of 
Northwestern Federal District, in % to the previous year*
Entity of the Northwestern Federal District
Year
2006 2008 2009 2011 2014
Republic of Karelia 76.4 123.3 27.3 126.5 143.5
Leningrad Oblast 95.2 102.0 107.1 125.6 140.0
Vologda Oblast 82.3 105.4 43.9 99.5 124.1
Kaliningrad Oblast 99.1 98.8 101.6 116.7 120.3
Komi Republic 102.0 101.7 78.3 110.0 104.7
Arkhangelsk Oblast 97.9 45.0 175.6 121.3 101.4
Saint Petersburg 87.3 83.9 111.1 125.2 103.6
Pskov Oblast 84.4 56.0 101.8 104.9 73.1
Novgorod Oblast 90.0 172.4 82.7 101.7 71.8
Murmansk Oblast 89.3 100.0 48.7 105.4 11.4
Number of regions, transferred more means to the federal 
budget in the current year than in the previous one 1 6 5 9 7
* Calculated according to the accountancy data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia (https://www.nalog.ru/rn35/related_activities/
statistics_and_analytics/forms/ (date of access: October 15, 2015).
In order to create incentives for territorial authorities and to build up tax revenues, we suggest 
the new procedure of their distribution relying on the estimation of correlation of tax revenues 
volume, collected on the territory of the region and entered the federal budget. If such correlation 
in the accounting period exceeds the value in the previous period by more than 100 %, then regional 
authorities will have 15 % of tax payments at their disposal (the value is determined by the method 
of collective expert estimations taking into consideration the balance of interests of the federal and 
regional authorities). Practical approval of the procedure, conducted on 83 RF entities 12, determined 
the existing reserves of growing tax proceeds in 36 RF entities. They could increase revenues by 2–12 %. 
Therewith, additional expenses of the federal budget will comprise 578 billion rubles, or 9.97 % of tax 
proceeds. 
Apart from the simplicity of calculations and availability of the information base, reduction of 
counter interbudgetary flows and increase of the budget planning level, the main advantage of the 
suggested approach to the vertical distribution of tax revenues between budgets will become the 
stimulation of the regional authorities to building taxable capacity. 
4. Potential for Efficiency Enhancement of Tax Instruments
D. A. Tatarkin and E. N. Sidorova in [12] fairly noted that shift in emphasis in favor of redistributional 
relations would hardly give a new impetus to territories to raise their revenues, taking into consideration 
that surpluses of revenues received by the economy's efficiency enhancement, would be seized and 
12 Pechenskaya, M. A. (2014). Otsenka rezultativnosti regulirovaniya mezhbyudzhetnykh otnoshenii (na primere Vologodskoi oblasti): 
avtoref. dis. na soisk. uch. st. kand. ekon. nauk: 08.00.10 [Evaluation of intergovernmental relations regulation efficiency (case study of the 
Vologda Oblast): Ph.D. in Economics dissertation abstract]. Moscow, 23.
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then by the way of redistribution transferred to other territories. In order to start and activate the 
financial mechanism of regions' self-development, it is necessary to present efficient tax incentives 
and leverage. Results of investigations conducted by the Institute of Socio-Economic Development of 
Territories of the Russian Academy of Sciences testify existence of a number of possible incentives and 
leverage. 
I. Tax incentives policy optimization. According to calculations conducted by Doctor of Economics, 
Professor N. N. Tyutyuryukov [13], at the Federation's entity level 172 concessions could be provided 
on regional taxes, at the municipality level — more than 48 thousands of concessions. It is hard to 
imagine high efficiency of the monitoring and management of such situation. Escalated inventory 
check of the tax concessions list should be based on a well-reasoned approach to strike a balance of 
increasing tax, and consequently, investment attractiveness of territories and stability of filling the 
budget with revenues. 
It is necessary to conceive that population and country's enterprises are the federal tax payers, but 
not the entities of the Federation at all. At the same time, the tax system has an overwhelming impact 
on the development of the Russian economy, especially in the manufacturing sector. The state tries 
to complete the task of the ''visible'' support of enterprises by the broad expansion of the preferential 
tax treatment. There is no doubt that concessions provided in order to modernize production and 
implement innovations make economic sense, along with the existence of budget and social 
effectiveness. However, due to the absence of compensation mechanisms in Russia, one of the results 
of such tax incentives system could be the reduction of revenues in territories' budgets. According to 
the Federal Tax Service of Russia, in 2014 tax revenues of regions' budgets decreased by 3 % as a result 
of the currently federal legislation and by 24 % because of taking local regulatory legal acts regarding 
benefits. Losses of the local budgets comprised 15 and 19 % respectively. 
Volumes of the corporate and individual property tax revenues serve as a bright example of 
reducing territorial revenues from providing concessions. The rate of provided concessions regarding 
the corporate property tax decreased by 26 % comparing 2014 and 2007, but as for the individual 
property tax it increased four times, moreover, up to 97 % of concessions are established by the federal 
legislation (Table 4). 
Table 4
Volume of regional and local taxes, not transferred to the territorial budgets due to granting preferences  
in 2007, 2014*
Tax
Shortfall in tax revenues, 
in % to the sum payable 
to the budget 
Volume of tax concessions
2007 2014
Sum, billion 
rubles
including 
established 
by the federal 
legislation, %
Sum, billion 
rubles
including 
established 
by the federal 
legislation, %
2007 2014
Regional taxes: 77.5 28.5 251.8 50.4 185.4 11.3
corporate property tax 91.5 29.4 247.4 51.3 184.0 11.4
transport tax 8.1 5.6 4.4 0.03 1.4 0.09
Local taxes: 38.6 34.4 30.1 24.6 70.7 42.3
land tax 35.8 28.7 24.8 9.3 49.3 19.7
individual property tax 60.4 63.6 5.3 97.0 21.4 94.3
* Calculated according to the accountancy data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia (https://www.nalog.ru/rn35/related_activities/
statistics_and_analytics/ (date of access: October 15, 2015).
To optimize tax incentives policy and to form the list of efficient tax concessions aimed at solving 
the main problem of economic growth, it is necessary to carry out the following activities: 
1) developing the principle of selective tax incentives: 
— the introduction of tax preferences for business structures dealing with high-quality production 
development [14]; 
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— providing tax holidays for newly registered private entrepreneurs and organizations declared 
about their switching to the simplified taxation system or to paying UTII during the first two years of 
activity 13; 
2) transformating the mechanism of tax discrimination concerning property taxes by the way of 
variability of nontaxable areas depending on allocation of taxpayers to one or another social category 
instead of exemption of class of payers from taxes 14; 
3) introduction of compensation forms regarding shortfall in revenues of RF's entities due to 
making amendments and additions to the tax legislation, in particular as a result of exemption of the 
federal tax concessions. One of such forms could be a subsidiary mechanism of maintaining revenues 
level of regional budgets. It makes sense to introduce four-year moratorium on making amendments 
and additions to the current tax and levy legislation: 
— elaborating at the federal level the compensation mechanism for territorial budgets' revenues, 
falling out as a result of exemption of federal tax concessions on regional and local taxes; 
— making taxpayers receiving tax concessions responsible for forming and providing reports 
regarding the usage of received tax concessions to the financial authorities; 
— recording information about providing and acting of tax preferences during all stages of the 
budget process: while forming the budget's project (including the amount of tax concessions to the 
expected volume of tax proceeds); during the budget execution (control over usage of tax concessions); 
in the course of preparing the report about the budget execution (including the data regarding the 
efficiency and productivity of tax concessions). 
II. The increase of tax collection rate. According to the accountancy data of the Federal Tax Service of 
Russia, on August 01, 2015 tax arrears to the budget comprised 486 billion rubles that are 10 % higher 
than the indicator was for the same period last year. 
Nevertheless, in order to improve tax collection, for instance, PIT, it is rational to carry out the 
following activities: 
1. Enhancement of population's financial literacy, including sharing information about social 
consequences of ''envelope wages'' and necessity of disclosing information about organizations and 
entrepreneurs carrying out such payments. 
2. Establishing responsibility of employers for ''envelope wages''. 
3. Progressive taxation recovery of personal revenues, that requires adjustment of some aspects of 
the tax system 15: 
— establishing a classification of revenues according to the source type of their acquisition (earned, 
rental, passive) in order to introduce minimum tax rates concerning the first type and maximum 
regarding the last ones; 
— introducing the special position of extremely high and extremely low revenues: tax exemption 
of disadvantaged population, luxury goods taxification; 
— establishing the list of activity categories, having the opportunity of concealment of revenues 
(IE, lettings, and motor transportation) in order to maintain the flat-rate tax on them. 
4. Establishing for tax agents quarterly reporting regarding withholding of tax and tax remission 
to the budget by economic entities in order to increase control the expediency of remitting the tax. 
5. Confirming the status and powers of commission for the legalization of shadow wages. 
6. Elaborating the legislative aspect of the problem concerning control of corporate entities 
migration. 
13 O zadachakh Soveta Federatsii po realizatsii polozheniy Poslaniya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii Federalnomu Sobraniyu [On 
tasks of the Federal Assembly regarding the implementation of provisions of the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly]. (2015). 
Analiticheskiy vestnik Soveta Federatsii [Analytical Herald of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation], 9, 562. Retrieved from: 
http://council.gov.ru/activity/analytics/analytical_bulletins/54765 (date of access: November 15, 2015).
14 Problemy normativno-pravovogo regulirovaniya kadastrovogo ucheta i nalogooblozheniya nedvizhimogo imushchestva [Problems 
concerning the legal and regulatory framework of cadastral registration and taxation of real estate]. (2015). ). Analiticheskiy vestnik Soveta 
Federatsii [Analytical Herald of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation], 5, 558. Retrieved from: http://council.gov.ru/activity/
analytics/analytical_bulletins/52203 (date of access: November 05, 2015).
15 Problemy i varianty napolneniya dokhodnoy chasti byudzheta [Problems and variants of filling the revenue part of the budget]. 
(2011). Analiticheskiy vestnik Soveta Federatsii [Analytical Herald of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation [Analytical Herald 
of the Federal Assembly of RF], 2, 414. Retrieved from: http://council.gov.ru/activity/analytics/analytical_bulletins/25876 (date of access: 
November 01, 2015).
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Key measures of improving collection of regional and local taxes are systematized and classified 
in the table 5. 
Table 5
Key measures of improving collection of regional and local taxes
Tax type Measures of tax collection rate enhancement
Transport tax
The introduction of taxpayer's responsibility for presenting the certificate of no arrears in 
passing technical inspection, registration, re-registration. Organizing monthly tax officers' 
raids accompanied by the STSI bodies and the Court Bailiffs Service working with tax evaders. 
Conducting the data monitoring concerning transport vehicles subject to taxation for the 
purpose of their updating
Individual property 
tax
Creating information systems of urban planning according to the requirements of the Building 
Code of Russia. 
Confirming the deadline dates during which newly-built buildings, constructions and other 
installations should be registered. 
Development of the legislative act on incomplete construction projects taxification
Corporate property 
tax
Improvement of information interaction between the financial and registering authorities.
Revealing the actual existence of property and undocumented taxable items
Land tax
Enshrining in the Tax Code of the Russian Federation both maximum and minimum effective 
marginal tax rate. 
Carrying out activities of revealing land owners and attracting them to taxification
Source: [15].
III. Efficiency improvement of the institute of taxpayers consolidated groups (TCG). Results of the 
last monitoring conducted by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation testify the impact of 
creating TCG on decreasing revenues of income tax to the budget system of RF (table 6). 
Table 6
Impact assessment of creating TCG on the amount of income tax, billion rubles*
Type of budget
2012 2013 Sum of 
deviationsw/o TCG with TCG deviation w/o TCG with TCG deviation
Consolidated budget of RF 493.1 484.3 –8.8 461.7 443.4 –18.3 –27.1
Federal budget 51.0 50.5 –0.5 48.1 46.2 –1.9 –2.4
Consolidated budgets of RF's 
entities 442.1 433.8 –8.3 413.6 397.2 –16.4 –24.7
* Byulleten Schetnoy palaty RF [Bulletin of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation]. (2014). №9. Retrieved from: http://
audit.gov.ru/activities/bulleten/797/ (date of access: November 10, 2015).
Despite a moratorium on forming TCG in 2015, the activity of this institute, allowing consolidation 
of losses, has led to the considerable reduction of the tax base. During 2014, 31 regions have lost 65 
billion rubles, during the first part of 2015 — 47 regions has lost 53 billion rubles. 16 Due to the inefficient 
redistribution of the tax base between regions, the government discusses the possibility of prolonging 
the moratorium on forming new TCG from 2016 till 2018. 17 
The top-priority goal concerning TCG should be the development of the special pattern of their 
tax registration according to the types of consolidation in order to minimize the possibility of abusing 
the granted right of association. Such pattern would become a particular warranter of providing 
transparency of intra-group tax relations for taxation bodies, and consequently, would make the 
reduction of tax risks possible. 
16 Osnovnye napravleniya povysheniya effektivnosti raskhodov federalnogo byudzheta. Realnost i perspektivy. Vystuplenie 
Predsedatelya Schetnoy palaty RF T. A. Golikovoy na parlamentskikh slushaniyakh v Sovete Federatsii [Basic directions of efficiency 
improvement of the federal budget's expenses. Reality and prospects. The speech of the Chief of the Chamber of Accounts of RF T.A. 
Golikova at the parliament proceedings in the Federal Assembly]. Retrieved from: http://www.audit-it.ru/news/account/843473.html (date 
of access: November 11, 2015).
17 Kruglyy stol po voprosu funktsionirovaniya instituta konsolidirovannykh grupp nalogoplatelshchikov [The round table regarding 
the institute's operation of taxpayers consolidated groups]. Ministerstvo finansov RF [Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation]. 
Retrieved from: http://www.minfin.ru/ru/press-center/ (date of access: November 11, 2015).
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Conclusion
Consequently, contemporary tax distribution of budgetary powers offers hand-to-mouth 
opportunities for budgetary development of territories under the conditions of the federal state. 
Russian practice shows that the right of introducing taxes does not give financial independence to the 
territories, if such taxes occupy a slight share in the budget. 
Despite the differences of Russian territories according to the taxable capacity, the certain degree 
of income sources decentralization is necessary. In order to implement the principles of budgetary 
federalism, each level of the budget system should have those taxes, the base of which depend mostly 
on the economic policy of the particular level of power (assigning 100 % of income tax, all property 
taxes, taxes on small enterprises). 
The article presents the suggested ways of improving tax policy, which could ease the imbalance 
of the interests of the different levels of power regarding the economic efficiency, social justice, and 
macroeconomic stability, which would allow to strengthen the financial self-sustainability and to 
increase the number of developing regions and local governments. Alongside with creation of a favorable 
treatment of searching and mobilizing internal sources of additional revenues, the responsibility of 
territorial authorities for the results of their own managerial decisions is also going to rise. 
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